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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

113.

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ADPC

ACCESSION NO.

S 1289

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

March 21, 1949

| TO                 | ROOM NO. | DATE     |           | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS  |
|--------------------|----------|----------|-----------|--------------------|---|
|                    |          | RECEIVED | FORWARDED |                    |   |
| 1. [ ]             | 7        | 4/6      | 4/7       | [ ]                | In connection with 7620's two memoranda this subject Most interesting. Thank you. |
| 2. <del>ADPC</del> |          |          |           |                    |   |
| 3.                 |          |          |           |                    |   |
| 4. CWT             |          |          |           |                    |   |
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| 15.                |          |          |           |                    |   |

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 25X2  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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Dear Pilgrim:

Since writing you my memoranda of January 22 and February 5, I have spent some time in Italy, Greece, Egypt, and with Horatio, Turkey, studying the Albanian situation. In each country I preferred to work through established American or indigenous contacts rather than approach the Albanians directly and risk an unwelcome surge of publicity. As a result of this approach, my investigation has been brought this far without causing a ripple of interest.

What struck me hardest in the course of my investigation was how little information we have. Our regular reporting services seem to have missed some important opportunities. In this report I make some comments and some recommendations upon this subject.

As I got deeper into the investigation I became more and more impressed with the urgency and importance of preparing an Albanian operation. With this in mind I have moved straight into a report of action (in Greece where with the Ambassador's backing we have the authority to take action) and recommendation (in neighboring lands where we have no authority) without taking the time for a preliminary exchange of views with you. I hope that you will let me know your general reaction and your specific instructions particularly on the recommendations made in Section II-F.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Cicero

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TO: Pilgrim

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March 21, 1949

FROM: Cicero

SUBJECT:

THE ALBANIAN OPERATION

INTRODUCTORY

There remains considerable ground work to be prepared before we can take action with a reasonable likelihood of success in Albania to replace the present Government with one to our liking. (1) We must time our action to a moment when the Greek National Army is victorious in Epirus and a Greek Government in Athens is not bristling with hostility towards Albanians. This requires some waiting and much working. I feel it must be clear that if we were to provoke a violent change in Albania now, when a large part of Northwestern Greece is only sketchily under the control of the Athens Government, we would risk spreading the danger, which Albania today represents to us, through the transfer of a small power vacuum into a large one. How clearly such is against our interests is proven by the fact that the Cominform is at this moment trying to enlarge a small power vacuum ("Free Greece") into a large power vacuum ("Macedonia"). I am sure it is equally clear that a victorious Greek army in Epirus and a government in Athens hostile to the Albanians in its propaganda output, do not provide the conditions under which our venture will easily succeed. (2) We must, while working towards a propitious setting in Greece, bring about a semblance of unity among the Albanian refugees. As long as the various Albanian groups in democratic lands are using up their energies in factional fights we cannot offer the people of the Albanian homeland a spectacle much better than what they now have, except perhaps for that little improvement that may come from any change including the substitution of one government that has to keep itself in power through police methods by another

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another government that must, because of its narrow basis of support, use similar methods. (3) Within Albania we must concentrate upon a softening-up program, primarily through the media of radio broadcasts from: (a) the Voice of America (b) the Athens radio with a propaganda line very different from its present and (c) the projected Salonika radio. At the same time we must step up infiltration from the Greek frontiers through the organizations now in operation and new ones that may be developed. (4) Finally we must know our own minds as to exactly what we want in Albania and prepare now for our "follow-through" in order to save ourselves unpleasant surprises after the successful initial operation.

Each of the first three above numbered subjects is reviewed in the detail that seems desirable in the next paragraphs. Certain recommendations are included. The final subject is one that from its very nature must be thought through in Washington and so a discussion of it is inappropriate here. Then there follows a section indicating some of the imponderables in the situation.

## I THE GREEK ANGLE

### A THE GREEK NATIONAL FORCES

The Greek National Army is organized in eight Infantry Divisions, three independent brigades, four groups of Commandos and 96 battalions of National Guard. Of the latter 55 have been manned by recruits and the rest still by National Guards. The GNA moreover disposes of corresponding means of support, such as artillery, engineers, armored regiments, signals and maintenance services.

The total

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The total approved strength of the Army is 197,000, of which 39,496 include administrative and training personnel of training centers and schools; officer cadets at military college; reserve officer trainees; conscripts in basic training camps; and men on list "Y" (that is other ranks on long leave of absence from their units by reason of casualty, illness, etc.), and finally the reinforcements at disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, that is 2,000 men. The combat units of the GNA, including Headquarters, Infantry and supporting arms, amount to 133,804 men. Corps and services taking an indirect part in operations amount to 23,700 men. The Army is supported by an Air Force of 7,200 men; a Navy of 14,300; a Gendarmerie of 23,000 and civil police numbering 8,000.

Soon after General Papagos took over in January his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Army morale improved considerably. This improvement came from several causes. General Papagos was aided by good luck at Florina where he inflicted a crushing defeat upon the bandits. His operations in clearing the Peloponnese have gone forward well. He has ordered whenever conditions permit the withdrawal of units from combat for rest and training.

With the cooperation of the American Missions, General Papagos has been able to secure increased allowances for the families of mobilized men as well as an increase in officers' pay. The American Missions, the Greek Government and nation have given him all the help possible. This new spirit, expressed in a will to succeed, is being dramatically focused under the inspiring leadership of Mrs. Grady on a National Rally on March 20-25 which is assuming the appearance of an old time revival meeting on a national scale.

B THE BANDITS

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General Papagos, in describing on February 5 the aims and tactics of the bandits, said that it is clear that the primary aim of the bandit command is not to seize power by armed force but rather to create an intolerable situation by increasing destruction through which the bandits hope to weaken the faith of the people in their national leaders, and their confidence in the ability of the state to impose its authority, in the hope to obtain through misery and the loss of morale what cannot be obtained directly by force of arms. The General added that it is evident that the bandit command estimates the time factor is in its favor as in time the above evils become intensified.

To achieve this aim the bandits have progressively created bases throughout the country from which they proceed to destroy means of communication, to attack inhabited localities so as to deprive the population from any feeling of security and plunge it in misery while, by the same actions, they obtain their means of sustenance, increase their strength, and undermine the authority of the State. Such "hit and run" tactics of the guerrillas are difficult to cope with in mountainous territory.

The bandit strength in January 1948 was 21,500. These men disposed of four ascertained and eight indefinitely located pieces of artillery. In January 1949 the bandit strength was 25,000 men backed by an estimated 6,000 reserves in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These men are reported to have 2 mountain guns of 105 millimeters, 24 mountain guns of 75 millimeters, 4 mountain guns of 65 millimeters, 20 anti-tank anti-aircraft guns of 30 millimeters

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millimeters and 8 of 37 millimeters. The bandits are adequately supplied with small arms and ammunition. This bandit force is supported in the interior of the country by an unarmed banditry called Self Defense Units and by voluntary or involuntary fellow travellers. In the frontier area the bandit force maintains bases inside of Greece which are tenaciously held and serve as bridgeheads from Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as well as safe refuges in case of need.

The discipline (based in large part on terroristic methods) and morale of the bandits, which varies according to the areas, was generally good at the opening of this year. They planned, according to statements of captured bandits, which confirm General Papagos' statements, to increase the threat to the national territory and cause a further drop below last year's low in the national morale, to cause an increase in the number of refugees, to reinfest the areas cleared by the National Army, in the manner Roumeli and Thessaly were reinfested after the clearings of 1947 and 1948.

In the course of the last few weeks the morale of the bandits suffered considerably due to the successful military operations of the GNA, particularly in the Peloponnese, and to the confusion created by the bandit high command, which brought disillusionment to many Greeks, fellow travellers and Communists, by unmasking the plan of the international Communist authorities to dismember Greece. Bandit leaders, apparently anticipating continued military success of the GNA, and fearing the new spirit that is abroad in Greece today, now are making frantic efforts to bolster the morale of their followers.

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### C THE MILITARY FUTURE

On February 5th General Papagos, in commenting upon the Greek situation at the beginning of 1949 as compared with the beginning of 1948, said in part: "The general situation shows no improvement whatsoever. There is practically no part of the national territory free of the threat of a bandit attack. The bandits lately operate offensively against large urban centers with important forces. Areas such as Roumeli and Thessaly, which have been cleared in 1947 and 1948, have been infested again."

Since this was said there has been a marked upturn in national morale and achievement. The successes obtained by taking action simultaneously in a large area (the Peloponnese) while at the same time protecting vital points throughout the rest of the country, hampering the provision of the supplies to bandit bands, and preventing the increase of their forces through recruitment, have indicated the line that will be followed by the GNA command in searching the solution of the bandit problem this spring and summer. Hence, by the progressive clearing of areas, with the occupation and control of the cleared areas firmly held in National hands, we hope to see most combat units of the GNA by the end of the summer campaign grouped near the Northern frontier, especially in those areas held or threatened by the bandit forces. This will mark the completion of the first part of the first essential condition (as set forth in the introductory paragraph) for the carrying through of a successful Albanian operation.

### D THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE

The Greek Government maintains that war began between Greece and Albania October 28, 1940 and legally continues today. It seems never to lose an occasion to state its grievances against Albania and to put forward its

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claims against that country. It would like to detach from Albania and attach to Greece a band of land to the west of the present frontier, comprising roughly a fifth of the total area of Albania, It broadcasts its claims frequently by radio and at suitable moments puts them forward through the mouths of Greek statesmen and newspapermen. For all practical purposes it does not distinguish between the Albanian Government and Albanians. Consistent with this attitude it treats Albanians in Greece today with a tolerance little above that accorded to enemy aliens during hostilities. I have been told that almost every Albanian, formerly a refugee in Greece who has now left Greece, feels bitter towards the Greek Government. As an example of the careless or callous attitude extended such Albanians by the Greek Government I recall the instance a few months ago when a group were transported to Italy under an IRO plan, in the course of which the evacuees had to remain outdoors without any shelter. As the result of such instances and more generally because of the continued Greek hostility toward Albania and agitation for the annexation of southern Albania, Albanians abroad and no doubt at home as well consider Greece an enemy. Under existing circumstances it would be extremely difficult for any self-respecting and reputable Albanian exiles to work from Greece for the liberation of their country. The Albanians still in Greece are even more acutely conscious of Greek feelings and are therefore unwilling to help positively. As a matter of fact, many Albanians in Greece consider the Greek Government is not so much against the Communist Albanian Government as anti-Albanian. They are right.

We must bring about a modification of this Greek official attitude if we expect to create an atmosphere in Greece that is harmonious to the

bringing about of a change in government in Albania. All the more so as the Albanians strongly, if mistakenly, believe that the present attitude of the Greek Government is approved by the United States. (In fact, of course, the United States has informed the Greeks that we do not support their territorial claims against Albania, The U.S. considers the claims possess no ethnic, little strategic, and less historical basis.) It looks as though we can bring about sufficiently the desired change in the Greek Government's attitude through the use of gentle persuasion by several sections of our Embassy in Athens. The Ambassador, therefore, has directed the Chief of the Political Section to bring up in informal talks with Greek Foreign Office officials the subject of the Greek official attitude toward Albania, and to reiterate the U.S. position with regard to the Greek pretensions. In these talks a persistent effort will be made to steer the Greek Government from what amounts to an actual anti-Albanian policy to a policy that is clearly only an anti-Communistic Albanian policy. The Ambassador has directed the Chief of USIS to use his influence on Radio Athens so that the broadcasts to and concerning Albania take on a character that will be helpful to our project. In this we hope to work out an arrangement whereby Radio Athens on Albanian matters will use the type of material that we hope to see used by the Voice of America. The groundwork will thereby be laid both for a possible Greek renunciation of the territorial claims at the proper moment and public acceptance of this action. If this approach works as planned it will mark the completion of the second part of the first essential condition (as set forth in the introductory paragraph) for the carrying through of a successful Albanian operation. If the approach proves inadequate, we shall proceed to the use of firmer methods.

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## II THE ALBANIAN REFUGEES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Most Albanian refugees residing in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Greece and Italy gravitate into one of three groups: the republican Balli Kombetar under the presidency of Midhat Frasheri, the Monarchist under King Zog and the conservative National Independent Bloc under the presidency of Ismail Verlaci.

### A TURKEY

There are an estimated 300 Albanian refugees in Turkey, Midhat Frasheri, president of the Balli Kombetar, is at the present time there attempting to form a united front among the Albanian refugees. If he achieves this he hopes to secure the same recognition from the Western Powers that G.M. Dimitrov of Bulgaria enjoys.

Frasheri and his close followers believe that Hoxha Government cannot be overthrown without a serious struggle. They think that an attempt to overthrow it must be backed by a considerable supply of arms and ammunition in the hands of an expeditionary force of Albanian nationals. They believe that any attempt to bring about a revolution in Albania will be resisted strongly by the Soviet authorities and that the present-day Communist controls are so strict that no movement can gain headway within Albania but must be prepared and launched from abroad.

Gazi Khan Bessolt claims to be, and is probably, King Zog's principal representative in Turkey. The Turkish Secret Police, for reasons of their own, have stated that Avni Derella, a former colonel in Zog's army, is Zog's principle representative in Turkey. Gazi Khan says that Zog repeatedly has made clear his willingness to accept the form of government that the Albanians choose

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choose by plebiscite after the Hoxha regime is over thrown. He adds that the former King is willing to cooperate closely with any group of exiles working towards the overthrow of the present Communist government. Gazi Khan believes that the present moment is propitious for a revolution in Albania and that this revolution will succeed without military support from the Western powers. This relatively optimistic view should probably be attributed to Gazi Khan's adventurous spirit rather than a considered estimate based on reliable information.

An officer of the Consulate General of whom I asked information about the Albanians, said: "There is not much to be learned. The Turks extract every drop of information before releasing the newcomers and the old refugees are only interested in financial support for themselves, jobs for their relatives and an American expeditionary force behind them when they return to Albania! This was the frank opinion of an honest officer, but it seems to me to illustrate the need for reestablishing a Reporting Office in Istanbul under the direction of an experienced officer who knows how to exploit to the utmost every possible source of information. I think this is important and urgent, not only for Albania, but for all countries behind the Iron Curtain. I can think of no better man to do this job than Mr. Roy Melbourne.

#### B EGYPT

There are a reported 50 principal Albanian refugees in Egypt. Nearly all of these are members of former King Zog's suite or former Albanian public officials who have been given refuge in Egypt through the intervention of Zog. They appear all to support or acquiesce in his leadership.

The most prominent of these are: Stir Martini, Minister of the Royal Court; Col. Husein Selmani, A.D.C. and envoy at large among Albanian emigres;

Prince Sali

Prince Sali, Selmani's nephew; Kemal Bey Mesaria, Chamberlain to the King; Colonel Abbas Kupi, guerrialla leader and founder of Legality Party (zogist); Abdul Scola, pre-war Albanian Charge in Cairo; Professor Gogo-gago, A.D.C. to Zog's sisters; Musa Yuka, Minister of Interior during Zog's regime; Midhi Bey Frasheri, formerly Chief Regent under the Germans; Mustapha Kreyas, Quisling Prime Minister until 1943; Khafer Deva, Minister of Interior under the Germans; Koco Maha, Quisling Minister of Education under the Germans; Ali Klisure, anti-communistic Balli Kombetar leader; and Salen Myftia, leading Moslem from Scutari.

Since his arrival in Cairo in the spring of 1946 King Zog has established close and friendly relations with King Farouk as well as with the royal Italian and Bulgarian families. He has been active too in building up his own prestige with his fellow countrymen in exile, notably by arranging for the settlement of Albanian DP's in the Near East. Zog's desire is to form a Royal Government in exile or, failing that, a National Committee of Liberation under his domination. He has said that he wishes to take an active part in fighting the Communists in Albania and that he would be willing to leave to the future decision of the Albanian people the answer to the question as to whether he should rule the country again. Nevertheless, he has shown little willingness to work out an agreement with his former political enemies in order to make good his fine words. However, his friendship with King Farouk, the prestige of his former position, his considerable personal wealth, plus his capacity for intrigue, make him, in spite of the relatively small number of his followers, a power to be taken into consideration when weighing the sources of influence behind any Albanian revolutionary movement.

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Our Embassy in Cairo said in one of its despatches last Autumn:  
"No one (among the Albanians) has contacted us for the last six months",  
indicating that it has not been very active in following the Albanian  
problem. I believe it thought that the Department was not particularly  
interested.

C SYRIA

I understand that there are at least 150 Albanian refugees in Syria.  
Most of these people are Moslems, having been brought from Italy and settled  
in Syria through an arrangement made by King Zog. They are all more or less  
directly under Zog's control. I understand that they are not very happy in  
their new home and would like to return to Italy and emigrate to the Western  
Hemisphere. I have not visited Syria since working on this project.

D GREECE

In Greece at the present time there are more than 500 Albanian refugees.  
It is expected that some 350 of these will leave for Italy by the end of this  
month under IRO auspices. The sick and the aged will remain in Greece. At  
the present time the most prominent Balli Kombetar figure in Greece is Abas  
Ermenji. The most prominent Zogists are: Major General Previsi, C-in-C of  
the Albanian pro-German Army; Colonel Hysni Dema, C-in-C of the Albanian pro-  
German Gendarmerie and Colonel Fikri Dine. Should the Greek Government man-  
euver to prevent the departure of some of the Albanian leaders our Embassy  
will intercede informally on behalf of those Albanians considered important  
who want to leave.

E ITALY

In Italy there are said to be some 1500 Albanian refugees of which approx-  
imately one-half are now living in IRO camps. All three political groups are

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well represented. Among the leaders in Italy are: Balli Kombetar: Party Secretary Vasil Andoni, Halil Maci, Yani Dilo, Said Kryesiu, Zef Pail and Hasin Dosti; National Independent Bloc: President Ismail Verlaci, Secretary Ali Vrinoi, Xnemil Dino, Ernest Kaliqi and Kal Bob Marakaj; Zogists: Ferid Dervis and Zef Screggi.

We are fortunate in having in Italy experienced officers who are alert to the possibilities and are able, on receiving instructions, to guide developments.

#### F RECOMMENDATIONS

It is unlikely that the leaders of the three principal Albanian groups of refugees will find a lasting basis of agreement by themselves. They may be drawn together by their hatred of the common enemy, the Communists who now rule their homeland, but they can never forget that they form groups which came into being because of their hatred of each other and their desire, before the Communists came into power, to rid themselves of their political rivals. I believe, therefore, that as unity is unlikely to be achieved by common consent, it may be brought about by building up one group to a sufficient strength where the other groups will be drawn to it for their own survival. I think such unity can be accomplished comparatively easily if our Government will indicate albeit unofficially its desire to see the leadership in the fight to overthrow the Communist Government assumed by a single group, letting it be known at the same time that we should like to see all other groups associate themselves provisionally with this group, and that we hope that all refugee leaders will pledge themselves to abide by the decisions of this group until the Communists are ousted from Albania and a plebiscite is held to determine the form of government that the Albanian people themselves desire.

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Choosing the group that we wish to back means in reality choosing between the leaders of the three principal groups. A choice from among these three is a choice of the least objectionable. Weighing all things as they are seen from this spot, both as regards the reaction in Albania and throughout the democratic world, I believe that the best bet is Midhat Frasheri, the president of the Balli Kombetar group. If you decide upon him, it is important to bear in mind that, due to his age and character, he must necessarily become the figure-head rather than the active head of the new movement. The latter function must be performed by one of his subordinates, such as, for example, Yani Dilo or Abbas Ermenji. If you will indicate to me that you are prepared to follow this line of thinking I will make a trip to Egypt with Horatio where I believe that I can present the problem to our Embassy in Cairo in a way that it will have no objections to Horatio's contacting Zog's entourage in Alexandria in order to explain America's position and offer Zog the opportunity of making good his fine words to cooperate in the fight against communism.

This action, for all practical purposes, will mark the fulfillment of the second essential condition (as set forth in the introductory paragraph) for the carrying through of a successful Albanian operation. It's further implementation should be arranged by our officers in Italy from the leadership and men available there.

### III THE SOFTENING-UP PROGRAM

#### A RADIO

(a) Insofar as I know there is no Voice of America program in the Albanian language beamed to Albania. But there is an urgent need for this

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and the need should be filled immediately. It is important to plant and develop the thought among the Albanian people that they are only temporarily outside the democratic fold, that the world recognizes their right to an independent existence and sympathizes with the disasters that have overwhelmed Albania since 1939. The tenth anniversary of the Fascist seizure of the country would be an appropriate date to begin Voice of America broadcasts. When broadcasts start it will be useful to receive copies in Athens of all scripts broadcast from New York in order that we may make use of them in the original or adapted form by Radio Athens and Radio Salonika.

(b) The final paragraph of Section "I-D" includes a statement of action that is now being taken through the competent officers of our Embassy in Athens that should bring about a change in the line being broadcast by Radio Athens. I anticipate that the change will be gradual but that it will take place sufficiently clearly within the next few months, while the military campaign is progressing northward, so that when the Greek National Armies are near the frontier the attitude of the Greek Government, as expressed through the Athens radio, will be an attitude that is satisfactory to our needs.

(c) Nearly a year ago a plan was worked out for the establishment of a powerful radio station in Salonika. Last summer American equipment in Italy was shipped to Greece and preparations were started looking to the setting up of the station. Progress, however, has been halting. When the first packing cases arrived from Italy marked with the code name "Dora" the authorities refused to pass them. It seems that a short time before their arrival a new clerk with the name Dora had arrived at the Salonika Consulate. She brought some things with her and said some more personal things were to follow.

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When, a few weeks later, steel towers and dynamos for "Dora" arrived, the Customs officials opened wide their eyes. They said that they would have to know more about "Dora" before passing the shipment, and only after some delay agreed to release the cases when receiving an official signed, sealed and certified statement setting forth that "Dora" was a code name for a government project and that the cases marked "Dora" had no relation whatsoever with the personal effects ~~for~~ of the recently arrived American clerk at the Consulate.

Appropriately located land had been selected and a legal process was set in motion to take it over (a process that is still going forward in slow motion) and an architect was designated to draw up plans for the building. He produced some drawings of a beautiful building but a preliminary examination of them showed that he had made no provision for electricity! There was some delay in getting a properly qualified architect to redraw the plans but the biggest delay has come about because the "Memorandum concerning the installation and operation of the radio station in Salonika" has not been signed by the Greek and American authorities. This memorandum establishes the terms governing the installation and operation of the radio station. It provides that United States will supply all technical parts and equipment, and retain ownership of the same, while the Greeks will supply all local materials and services. It provides for a joint American-Greek Committee to operate the station after an initial testing period, and that the United States will have final control over the contents of programs. The great obstacle, I understand, to the signing comes from the Minister of Finance who has refused to advance

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funds until the agreement is signed, and would even like to refuse to sign an agreement until he has the assurance that all equipment will eventually become the property of the Greek Government. The Ambassador has taken an interest in this project, and I am hopeful that the agreement will be signed shortly and that the station will be in operation within four months with the U. S. exercising effective control over the contents of programs.

B INFILTRATION

While our radio approach for a softening-up in Albania is going on apace, we must at the same time step-up those activities within the country which are accomplished through the services of men of purpose who have been infiltrated recently. This is a part of the operation that must be placed in the hands of proven specialists. I suggest that the following going institutions may be of possible use by our specialists in working their agents into position.

(a) The investigating teams of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) have free access from the Greek side to all points on the Albanian frontier. Thus they have a means of approach that should be valuable to us. Reports now being received by UNSCOB are based almost entirely upon the testimony of captured persons. There is, however, a time lag of about three months between the events and the Committee's reports. Obviously, therefore, the reports are not of much value to us in an Albanian operation but the existence of the Committee and its teams can be used advantageously by us. This possibility apparently is now under observation.

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(b) I understand the Italian Naval Intelligence is active now in sending agents into Albania. I know little about its purposes or operations but presumably some of our people working in Italy are well informed of them. We may be able to use some of its agents or to use it in sending in other agents.

(c) The North Epirus Society, which has its headquarters in Athens, has been very active in following closely developments occurring in Albania and in the preparation of reports based upon personal interviews with everyone who arrives in Greece from Albania. This Society takes special pains to interview Orthodox refugees from Albania as these people, being considered Greeks by Greek authorities, are not normally interrogated by the Aliens Bureau and usually are given only perfunctory questioning by the Army for military information. There is a possibility of exploiting to our advantage the activities of this Society and perhaps in using it in sending agents into Albania. In view of the strongly annexionist character of this Society any operations undertaken with this group must necessarily be separated from any movement by Albanian nationalists.

(d) At the present time the Commanding Officer of the 8th Division of the Greek National Army with headquarters in Jannina has a network of some 90 agents at work inside Albania. This is a "sheperds network". It was created to obtain tactical information of movements of bandit bands and do an occasional bit of sabotage. Being essentially a chain of shepherds it is slow in operation. A shepherd drives his flock from one pasturage to another

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and at his night's encampment meets another shepherd and transfers a verbal message. This chain uses no radios. At the present time this network is not deeper than 20 miles into Albania. I believe there is a possibility of using this service and, as the Greek armies advance northward, arrange for a deeper penetration.

(e) Placing a man in the French Legation Staff in Tirana, probably in the Military Attache's office, would be most delicate but potentially most rewarding.

(f) The possibility should be considered of utilizing the services of Roman Catholic priests in the Catholic (northern) portion of the country.

#### C CONCLUSION

Action if taken on these suggestions should accomplish a great deal toward softening-up the Albanian structure and should thereby meet the third essential condition (as set forth in the introductory paragraph) for the carrying through of a successful Albanian operation. Since the British will certainly learn of any moves we may make with regard to Albanian refugees, it is suggested that our tentative plans be outlined to the British in Washington and that an effort be made to secure their passive cooperation - but no more.

#### IV THE UNKNOWN QUANTITY

The preceding sections were written upon the assumption of the continuation of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA and the continuation of Cominform aid to the Greek guerrillas. This is a minimum assumption that we can safely make. Prudence, however, demands that we consider as well the possibility, which I personally think is a certainty, that International communism

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will setp-up

will step-up the tempo of its activities in the Balkans this year. In this section, therefore, I wish to consider briefly this possibility with special reference to our Albanian operation.

Two years ago the Soviet Union and satellites supported, to the extent that they could without bringing an open rupture within the United Nations, the Greek guerrilla cause. At that time Greece for them was a first priority order of business in the Balkans. The Soviet bloc then, as far as we could discern, presented a common front. Moscow led and the satellites obediently followed. Today things are different. Tito has dared challenge the wisdom and leadership of Moscow. This Moscow cannot tolerate. It must eliminate Tito and administer a lesson to others that might waver. Thus, today, from the Soviet angle, Yugoslavia, and not Greece, is a matter of first order of business in the Balkans.

In the past nine months we have felt tremors of increasing Soviet pressure upon Yugoslavia. The shift of forces that these tremors indicated, in my opinion, will soon be made in broad daylight. The preparations are now far underway. We know that so-called posts of aid for refugees are organized by the Hungarian Government near the Yugoslav border. Ostensibly these are to assist needy refugees but actually they are used as points from which to spirit agents into Yugoslavia. We know that units of the Hungarian army have been massed near the Yugoslav frontier; that units of the Bulgarian Army are concentrated near the Yugoslav frontier, and that the Albanian Army, which during the Greek campaign was stationed in the south of Albania, has been shifted to the north along the Yugoslav frontier. We know that these movements require Tito to disperse his army in order to counterbalance these threats.

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With Tito's forces thus separated the Cominform launched on the propaganda front the idea of an independent Macedonia in order to undermine his Serbian support. We know that the Yugoslav high military and civil command was Soviet trained and organized, and that, although superficially fanatically loyal to Tito, many elements of it will break away at the first safe opportunity. We know that many Yugoslav rank-and-file Communists are restrained by Tito's police from showing their true feelings but that from the moment he begins to lose control of the internal situation, these men will come to the fore as leaders of an anti-Tito movement in the hills. The Soviet pressure is tightening on Tito but as it appears unlikely that he will capitulate, knowing the consequences, or that the Soviets will be able to arrange the assassination of him and his three principal associates, it is likely that the pressure will continue to grow, slowly but gradually and progressively.

As the situation appears from here, there will be no open declaration of war by either Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, or Albania upon Yugoslavia. Rather there will be an intensification of hostile external pressure directed towards bringing about a blow-up of Yugoslavia from within. In this campaign the two southern bastions that the Soviets are bound to use as points of application for pressure are Bulgaria and Albania. We know that in both countries the Soviets are in the course of carrying through a military aid program in Greece. At the present time, according to a diplomat assigned to Tirana, there are at least 3,000 Russian military stationed in Albania. These are "instructors" for the Albanian Army, but they command. There is a regular Soviet air service from Bucharest through Sofia, Belgrade to Tirana. I am told that on

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occasions when the air cargo is such that the Yugoslavs should not know its contents the airplanes are prevented by "weather" from stopping in Belgrade. Shipping from Black Sea ports to Durrazo has been increased very much. I am, therefore, inclined to accept Midhat Frasheri's estimate that an operation in Albania, in spite of the low esteem held by the Albanians of the Hoxha Government, cannot now be brought about easily. A moment may come, however, when, before Russia wins its fight with Tito - while he is still fighting strongly and the outcome of the fight appears uncertain and to win Russia becomes involved as deeply as she must without actually going to war - a change can be made in Albania more easily. We must be ready to take advantage of that moment, but in our planning we must avoid over-optimism and carefully prepare for success the hard way.

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